AQO v Minister [2016] NSWCA 248
Later amendments can inform the interpretation of an earlier version of the Act, but only where the earlier provision is ambiguous and the amendment wasn’t simply meant to clarify the law and remove doubt2. Even then, you should only use later amendments in limited circumstances – for example, to reject an interpretation …
Van Heerden v Hawkins [2016] WASCA 42
If a provision mentions several specific things of the same type, and ‘other’ things generally, those ‘other’ things may also need to be of that type4. However, the specific things must have something in common – you must be able to identify a ‘genus’5. iTip – don’t apply this …
FCT v Croft [2016] QSC 190
If an Act expressly confers a specific power constrained by certain conditions, it may implicitly exclude the use of more general powers that could otherwise have achieved the same result7. However, like the ‘express references’ rule in Episode 16, this needs to be supported by context, and it shouldn’t be the only …
Byrne v Owners [2016] WASC 153
It is presumed, subject to contrary intent, that similar expressions attract the same meaning in similar statutes11 – in pari materia. Tax cases and a recent High Court decision illustrate the idea12. Pritchard J in this case (at [131]) observed that the presumption only applies between statutes, not where a …
Many common words like ‘business day’, ‘document’, ‘individual’, ‘land’, ‘person’ or ‘writing’ are defined in AIA s 2B. This dictionary should always be your starting point, though it is just a drafting convenience and, like the rest of the AIA, it is displaced by contrary intention in the Act it is applied to (s 2(2))1…
Prescribed forms of documents are common in tax laws. Under AIA s 25C, strict compliance with these forms isn’t necessary and substantial compliance is sufficient. This is determined by considering the purpose of the form and its contents as a whole, not by analysing its individual parts separately4. Failure to use the correct form isn’t necessarily fatal…
Like notes, examples are part of the Act but their interpretive status is unclear9. Under AIA s 15AD(a), they are ‘not exhaustive’ and can’t limit a provision’s scope. AIA s 15AD(b) used to say that a provision overrides its example if the two are inconsistent. It was rewritten in 2011 and now says ‘the example may extend …
These are governed by rules in AIA ss 7-11B. iNOW! has previously discussed the presumption against retrospectivity in s 7(2) and the cross-reference rules in s 1011. Section 7(1) also says that if a repealing Act or an Act altering the common law is itself repealed, the original law isn’t automatically revived.
Section 11B says that …
The Queen v A L [2016] VSCA 156
How do you interpret everyday words in a statute when they also have a specialised trade or technical meaning? Normally words take their ordinary meaning – particularly since parliament can define a word if it is meant to have a special meaning1. However, context, phrasing or subject matter may show …
Military Rehabilitation v May [2016] HCA 19
This case (at [52]) reminds us that when a judge explains what statutory words mean, their reformulation cannot be substituted for those words and construed as if it were the statutory text3. Unlike statutes, the meaning of judgments isn’t found by analysing the specific words used by the judge. Instead, read …
