BPG Caulfield Village v CSR [2016] VSC 172
The past dozen episodes of iNOW! cover a decent range of interpretational issues. Regularly, however, courts direct us back to the basics.
This case (at [32]) quotes Alcan3 for the following – (A) interpretation ‘must begin with a consideration of the text itself’, (B) historical considerations and extrinsic materials cannot …
Lockhart v United States 577 US (2016)4
In America, child pornography offences attract extra jail time if X has prior convictions for ‘aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor’. X pleaded guilty but had a prior for adult sexual abuse. Argument raged between 2 technical grammar rules – the ‘last antecedent’ and ‘series qualifier’ …
Commissioner of Police v Guo[2016] FCAFC 62
The principle of legality gets plenty of court time these days. Very clear words in an Act are needed to exclude important common law rights and doctrines. The issue in this case was whether public interest immunity was available in the AAT to prevent police being asked about informants. The finding (at …
Heatscape v Mahoney (No 2) [2016] NSWLEC 45
Episode 9 explains how regulations cannot control what an Act means. This case (at [149]) reminds us that the same principles we apply to statutes ‘are equally applicable to the interpretation of subordinate legislation’ – no surprises here.
An additional point11, however, is that delegated legislation is ‘less carefully drafted, …
Tabcorp Holdings v Victoria [2016] HCA 4
In this case (at [65]), the High Court said that a ‘consistent meaning should ordinarily be given to a particular term wherever it appears in a suite of statutory provisions’. This principle is a routine starting point when reading legislation. However, as the quote above indicates, it is not an inflexible rule. Episode …
Metricon v CCSR (No 2) [2016] NSWSC 332
When a court decides the meaning of a word in one statutory context, it is not precedent for what the same word may mean in a different context2. This case (at [47]) mentioned the ‘inherent flexibility’ of language, and said that decisions of this kind are of ‘persuasive influence’ only…
Lynn v NSW [2016] NSWCA 57
This case makes the point (at [54]) that the objects clause and long title of an Act can be taken into account as aids to construction – you knew that! The first rule, however, is that these things cannot be used ‘to contradict any clear and unambiguous language’, although they may assist in resolving …
Stanizzo v Secretary [2016] NSWSC 348
Books could be written about this. In federal laws, subject to contrary intention, ‘may’ signifies discretion7. But, where a statute says an official ‘may’ confer some benefit subject to preconditions, their satisfaction can create a legal duty to act8.
In this case, the legislation said the official ‘may’ determine costs …
Moreton Bay RC v Mekpine[2016] HCA 7
The High Court again points to the limited role that statutory definitions play. The issue was whether a definition of ‘common areas’ in one Act applied to another – answer ‘no’3. The court said (at [61]) that statutory definitions do ‘no more than define the meaning to be assigned to …
Abblitt v ADC [2016] TASSC 12
Are all statutes interpreted the same way, or does the old rule about reading beneficial provisions liberally still apply? The judge here (at [29]) said it did – the Act was to be given ‘a fair, large and liberal’ interpretation rather than one which is ‘literal or technical’7.
The High Court confirmed …
