AEU v DECS [2012] HCA 3
Listen up – ‘In construing a statute it is not for a court to construct its own idea of a desirable policy, impute it to the legislature, and then characterise it as a statutory purpose’ – so said the High Court (at [28]). This instruction applies to everyone, including agencies and administrators of the …
Certain Lloyd’s v Cross [2012] HCA 56
Where can you search for policy? Hill J said it was ‘enshrined’ in the provisions and in the ‘legislative context, so far as it casts light upon the proper interpretation’10. Later comments suggest it may be derived only from the Act11. This case (at [23-25]) favours the first approach …
Sea Shepherd v FCT [2013] FCAFC 68
Composite expressions must be read as a whole, not pulled apart word-by-word against a dictionary then re-assembled out of context. Gordon J (at [35]) cautioned against this kind of ‘atomised analysis’ in remarks which were later drawn to attention in her swearing in as a High Court judge3.
The point about …
Taylor v Owners Strata Plan [2014] HCA 9
Reading words into statutes used to be right up there next to heresy7. With the movement to purposive interpretation, however, things began to change – first in the UK8, then later here9.
The High Court in Taylor (at [35-40]) confirms that words can be read into …
Director v Adams [2015] FCA 828
For general purposes, notes are now part of the Act10, as this case reminds us (at [30-31]). Notes in tax legislation, however, may be subject to special rules11. They are part of the Act, but do not have the status of ‘explanatory sections’ or ‘guides’. This begs the question – …
GHP 104 160 689 v FCT [2014] AATA 515
iNOW! has now covered a range of important interpretation themes. This little R&D case on ‘feedstock expenditure’ conveniently discusses several of them (at [166]) – importance of the text; the Act as a whole; context and purpose; policy issues (especially preconceived policy); composite expressions (see above); and statutory definitions.
A good …
Skyy Spirits v Lodestar [2015] FCA 509
In 2010, the High Court said you shouldn’t look at extrinsic materials ‘before exhausting the application of the ordinary rules of statutory construction’2. Perram J took this as signalling some shift away from the settled idea that we are to look at context in the widest sense upfront.
Now, in Skyy …
EHL Burgess Properties v CSR [2015] VSC 295
This case reminds us (at [67]) that you can’t use regulations to interpret the Act they are made under. Otherwise, it ‘would be a case of the tail wagging the dog’3. One exception here is where the Act is expressly made subject to the regs.
Also, where the Act and …
LM v K Lawyers (No 2) [2015] WASC 245
When parliament uses different language to express an idea, it usually intends a different meaning. This is particularly so, said the court (at [18]), where ‘a long-established form of words’ is abandoned.
However, with mass-migration of provisions from ITAA36, s 1-3(2) of ITAA97 preserves original meaning where the same idea is …
Matthews v The Tap Inn [2015] SADC 108
Phrases in legislation like ‘is taken to be’ create a deeming provision, as this case notes (at [19]). Deeming provisions usually involve a ‘statutory fiction’ – a legal version of ‘let’s pretend’ – but only where the facts required are first made out7. They come in various guises – ‘deemed …
