Commissioner of Police v Guo[2016] FCAFC 62
The principle of legality gets plenty of court time these days. Very clear words in an Act are needed to exclude important common law rights and doctrines. The issue in this case was whether public interest immunity was available in the AAT to prevent police being asked about informants. The finding (at …
Heatscape v Mahoney (No 2) [2016] NSWLEC 45
Episode 9 explains how regulations cannot control what an Act means. This case (at [149]) reminds us that the same principles we apply to statutes ‘are equally applicable to the interpretation of subordinate legislation’ – no surprises here.
An additional point11, however, is that delegated legislation is ‘less carefully drafted, …
To get the culture we want means changing things, including how we communicate. Better communication starts with better understanding and involves simpler, smarter messaging delivered in more efficient, modern ways. iNOW! is a small part of this process at the ATO. We aim to boost awareness of interpretation issues generally via short simple messages – tweets almost. Reducing technical …
Tabcorp Holdings v Victoria [2016] HCA 4
In this case (at [65]), the High Court said that a ‘consistent meaning should ordinarily be given to a particular term wherever it appears in a suite of statutory provisions’. This principle is a routine starting point when reading legislation. However, as the quote above indicates, it is not an inflexible rule. Episode …
Metricon v CCSR (No 2) [2016] NSWSC 332
When a court decides the meaning of a word in one statutory context, it is not precedent for what the same word may mean in a different context2. This case (at [47]) mentioned the ‘inherent flexibility’ of language, and said that decisions of this kind are of ‘persuasive influence’ only…
Lynn v NSW [2016] NSWCA 57
This case makes the point (at [54]) that the objects clause and long title of an Act can be taken into account as aids to construction – you knew that! The first rule, however, is that these things cannot be used ‘to contradict any clear and unambiguous language’, although they may assist in resolving …
Stanizzo v Secretary [2016] NSWSC 348
Books could be written about this. In federal laws, subject to contrary intention, ‘may’ signifies discretion7. But, where a statute says an official ‘may’ confer some benefit subject to preconditions, their satisfaction can create a legal duty to act8.
In this case, the legislation said the official ‘may’ determine costs …
Finding the latest learning on an interpretation issue is not that hard. Go to the standard text1 and/or past episodes of iNOW! and locate the leading case or core passage. Select some keywords and run a ‘Boolean query’ through AustLII. If there are too many hits, add keywords. Review your catch under ‘by date’, clicking the ‘latest first’ …
Moreton Bay RC v Mekpine[2016] HCA 7
The High Court again points to the limited role that statutory definitions play. The issue was whether a definition of ‘common areas’ in one Act applied to another – answer ‘no’3. The court said (at [61]) that statutory definitions do ‘no more than define the meaning to be assigned to …
Abblitt v ADC [2016] TASSC 12
Are all statutes interpreted the same way, or does the old rule about reading beneficial provisions liberally still apply? The judge here (at [29]) said it did – the Act was to be given ‘a fair, large and liberal’ interpretation rather than one which is ‘literal or technical’7.
The High Court confirmed …
