Personal liberty

Archer v Minister [2025] FCA 471

Archer migrated in 1965 and held a permanent visa.  After conviction as an accessory to murder, her visa was cancelled on character and other grounds12.  The judge intimated that the cancelling provision was ‘to be construed by reference to the established principle … requiring strict construction of an Act which affects the …

Episode 122 – legislative purpose

In Ravbar v Commonwealth, the High Court upheld legislation1 that put the CFMEU into administration2.  The law did not infringe the implied freedom of political communication and was not otherwise invalid3.  The key provision required the Attorney-General to be ‘satisfied that, having regard to the Parliament’s intention in enacting [the legislation], it [was] in …

Episode 121

The ‘modern approach’ to statutory interpretation was first articulated in this country by Mason J in 19851.  Courts now tell us week-by-week that the principles are ‘well established’.  Indeed, they are so well established that often little more is said than that the method involved follows the familiar ‘text context purpose’ protocol.  Earlier this month, in a case …

Taxing statutes

Detector Inspector v CoInvest Ltd [2025] VSC 135

Given long service leave charges paid to a fund were a ‘tax’3, it was argued (A) that related rules should be read narrowly, and (B) that, where two meanings are reasonably open after applying the ordinary rules of interpretation, the issue should be resolved in favour of the taxpayer4

Anthony Hordern principle

Charlie [2025] FCAFC 55, KP [2025] NSWCA 69

These cases illustrate the caution necessary when applying the Anthony Hordern principle – that an express power subject to conditions excludes reliance on a general power over the same subject matter7Charlie (at [52-55]) says that the ambit of the express power must be wholly within or subsumed by the …

Drafting assumptions

Harris v Military Rehabilitation [2025] FCA 381

In this case, McEvoy J (at [26]) quotes as follows10

‘The current approach to statutory interpretation involves courts assuming that those drafting legislation, and parliaments which enact it, are familiar with the general principles of statutory construction, and that courts will take statutory language as they find it, read with the

Impact of practice

Gamage v Riashi [2025] NSWCA 84

At issue was whether ICAC could itself launch prosecutions against persons it had investigated.  Basten AJA answered ‘no’.  There was no express or incidental power permitting ICAC to launch prosecutions14.  This was despite the fact later parliamentary debates on amendments had referred to the ‘practice’ of ICAC commencing prosecutions which were later …

Episode 120

In 2021, the High Court said the principles of interpretation are ‘familiar’, adding – ‘Oftentimes they can seem banal’1.  The sense of this is that the principles are trite, commonplace or mundane.  Gageler J described them as ‘workaday’2.  A recent case observes again (A) that the principles are ‘well established’, and (B) that the language of …

Statutory fictions

Bogan v Estate of Smedley [2025] HCA 7

The general prohibition of contingency fees is subject to an exception in Victoria for ‘group costs orders’.  It was held that making an order of this kind was relevant to whether the proceedings should be transferred to NSW.  The transferee court was required to deal with the proceeding ‘as if’ steps taken …

Transitional provisions

Hanave [2025] NSWLEC 19, Hixson [2025] NSWSC 192

Two aspects of transitional provisions are touched on in these cases.  Hanave (at [62]), emphasises their temporary nature.  The judge observed that ‘transitional’ means passing from one condition to another.  It was added that provisions of this kind are meant to be ‘passing’ and not forever applicable.

In Hixson (at [55]) …