TRG v Brisbane Grammar School [2019] QSC 157
TRG sought, under limitation provisions5, an order setting aside a settlement agreement so that fresh proceedings could be taken against the school. Davis J refused to do so and (at [148]) commented on the proper way to identify statutory purpose.
The search is never for any subjectively held purpose of …
CCA19 v Dept of Home Affairs [2019] FCA 946
Project Blue Sky accepts that context may require statutory words to bear an ungrammatical meaning8. Our ‘modern approach’ also includes the limited ability to add or subtract words from legislation in correction of minor drafting errors9. This case sets out how these 2 themes interact.
Bromberg J …
In Masson v Parsons1, the recent sperm donor case, the High Court repeated key points about how we are to read statutes. First (at [26]), unless there is a basis in the text, context or purpose for a different meaning, words take their ordinary meaning2. Second (at [42]), any conflict between provisions is to be …
Spence v Queensland [2019] HCA 15
This case involved the validity of provisions that purport to enable retention of gifts for non-electoral purposes. Section 15A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 requires Acts to be read subject to the Constitution, and any enactment in excess of power ‘shall nevertheless be a valid enactment to the extent to which it is …
Bluescope Steel v AWU [2019] FCAFC 84
This case (at [54]) reminds us that, where a phrase is given a particular meaning by the court, other grammatical forms of that phrase (often called cognate or derivative expressions) have ‘similar effect’ where repeated in a later statute.
The High Court, in an earlier case, had determined that the phrase ‘ordinary time …
Goodacre v Lumbers [2019] WASC 184
Simple words sometimes cause unexpected complication. Did a cyber-stalking order prohibiting use of ‘the internet and any social network’ require the use of both for an offence to be committed? 9 The word ‘and’ is usually read conjunctively according to its ordinary meaning, but not always.
In this case, Derrick J (at [57]) read …
Northern Land Council v Quall [2019] FCAFC 77
The ability to do all things ‘necessary or convenient’ for performing statutory functions is a common mechanism for ensuring powers are adequate for their intended role12. The court (at [105-107]) sets out basic principles for giving content to powers of this kind. They are ‘strictly ancillary’, do not extend the …
Under the ‘modern approach’, objective discernment of statutory purpose is not only integral1 but also a requirement of the ‘unqualified statutory instruction’ in s 15AA2. For constitutional reasons3, however, the starting point in all cases must be the text of the statute. Context in the ‘widest sense’ is to be consulted as part of this …
Brewster v BMW Australia Ltd [2019] NSWCA 35
In a class action for faulty airbags in BMWs, a ‘common fund’ order was made that 25% of any proceeds be paid in priority to the litigation funder. Section 183 said that the court may ‘make any order that the Court thinks appropriate or necessary to ensure that justice is done in …
Tjungarrayi v WA [2019] HCA 12
This case (at [89]) reminds us that the operation of all statutory definitions yield to contrary intention10. The Act said that a native title claim could not be made over unallocated Crown land covered by a lease. While some parts of the Act said ‘lease’ included mining leases11, there was …
