R v Kay [2016] QCA 269
It is nothing new to observe, as this case does (at [26]), that common connection phrases like ‘in relation to’ and ‘in connection with’ often raise problems. The precise degree of connection fluctuates depending on purpose and context11, including ‘the subject matter of the inquiry, the legislative history, and the facts of …
Have you ever known (or thought you’ve known) the purpose of a provision because you were involved, in one way or another, in its drafting? You may have spoken to someone who claims to have written the law and is dead-set certain what they meant. This may be interesting but, when it comes to interpretation, it is irrelevant. As iNOW!…
AQO v Minister [2016] NSWCA 248
Later amendments can inform the interpretation of an earlier version of the Act, but only where the earlier provision is ambiguous and the amendment wasn’t simply meant to clarify the law and remove doubt2. Even then, you should only use later amendments in limited circumstances – for example, to reject an interpretation …
Van Heerden v Hawkins [2016] WASCA 42
If a provision mentions several specific things of the same type, and ‘other’ things generally, those ‘other’ things may also need to be of that type4. However, the specific things must have something in common – you must be able to identify a ‘genus’5. iTip – don’t apply this …
FCT v Croft [2016] QSC 190
If an Act expressly confers a specific power constrained by certain conditions, it may implicitly exclude the use of more general powers that could otherwise have achieved the same result7. However, like the ‘express references’ rule in Episode 16, this needs to be supported by context, and it shouldn’t be the only …
Byrne v Owners [2016] WASC 153
It is presumed, subject to contrary intent, that similar expressions attract the same meaning in similar statutes11 – in pari materia. Tax cases and a recent High Court decision illustrate the idea12. Pritchard J in this case (at [131]) observed that the presumption only applies between statutes, not where a …
The Acts Interpretation Act – a statutory Cabinet of Curiosities
It is not uncommon for a statute to be silent on something that appears to leave a hole in its operation, such as undefined words that obviously should be, unaddressed mechanical matters, and other esoteric issues. Before cursing the drafters and throwing the statute across the room in frustration, look …
Many common words like ‘business day’, ‘document’, ‘individual’, ‘land’, ‘person’ or ‘writing’ are defined in AIA s 2B. This dictionary should always be your starting point, though it is just a drafting convenience and, like the rest of the AIA, it is displaced by contrary intention in the Act it is applied to (s 2(2))1…
Prescribed forms of documents are common in tax laws. Under AIA s 25C, strict compliance with these forms isn’t necessary and substantial compliance is sufficient. This is determined by considering the purpose of the form and its contents as a whole, not by analysing its individual parts separately4. Failure to use the correct form isn’t necessarily fatal…
Like notes, examples are part of the Act but their interpretive status is unclear9. Under AIA s 15AD(a), they are ‘not exhaustive’ and can’t limit a provision’s scope. AIA s 15AD(b) used to say that a provision overrides its example if the two are inconsistent. It was rewritten in 2011 and now says ‘the example may extend …
